



Politecnico
di Torino

La QUALITÀ nell'AEROSPACE

Le sfide e i risultati

4-5 MAGGIO
2023
Politecnico di Torino

The International Habitat for Gateway Cislunar man-tended station

TAS contribution: overview and safety approach

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THALES ALENIA SPACE

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CISLUNAR GATEWAY



Provide continuous view of Earth and communication relay for Lunar far side

Support Lunar surface exploration


Relatively easy access from Earth orbit with current launch vehicles

Deep Space environment for testing exploration technologies and science

Image: courtesy NASA

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


Image: courtesy ESA

a Thales / Leonardo company



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Customer: European Space Agency



End User: NASA

Industrial consortium:

ITALY



• TAS in Italy: Prime Contractor

FRANCE



• TAS in France

Core Team

AUSTRIA



BELGIUM



CZECH REPUBLIC



GERMANY



NETHERLANDS



POLAND



ROMANIA



SPAIN



SWITZERLAND




UNITED KINGDOM



ITALY



FRANCE



Common Equipment




Ext. Robotics I/F





ECLSS Subsystem
Batteries
Cameras

ThalesAlenia
Space
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INTERNATIONAL HABITAT (I-HAB)



GATEWAY vs ISS Concept of Operations: safety and mission assurance impacts



GATEWAY Safety Approach: objective and philosophy

OVERALL OBJECTIVE

Safest practical design to accomplish the mission.


SAFETY PHILOSOPHY

Failure Tolerance as primary hazard control strategy against **catastrophic hazards**: loss of crew/loss of Gateway.

SAFETY REQUIREMENTS EVOLUTION

- ISS Program: tolerance to the “**combination of two failures**”
- Gateway Program: tolerance to “**at least a single failure**” on the bases of:
 - Improved confidence in hardware performance in space
 - Acquired knowledge on design robustness
 - Strict development and verification requirements (i.e., CBCS requirements for SW)

GP 10000 and GP10024 vs SSP 51721 Standard



GATEWAY Safety Approach


Safety analyses per **closed-loop approach** on design process:
hazards controlled and residual acceptable risk.

Hazard Reports provide vital information on hazard control strategy, as risk acceptance documents.

Risk-informed approach:

structured technical rationale for acceptability of a design not failure tolerant is requested direct into the Hazard Reports.

Residual **risk** accurate
characterization
and **communication**



GATEWAY Safety Approach

The specific data required to justify a failure tolerance deviation, named “**Exemption**”, will depend on the specific hazard cause for which the deviation is raised.

The information required as **technical merits for the acceptability** rationale shall address to more than 12 topics, as brief example:

- a) Why is an exemption needed?
- b) What is the duration of exposure to the hazard?
- c) What is the time to effect?
- d) [...].
- e) What information supports producibility of the design within acceptable risk?
- f) Address any operational limitations or requirements for humans to control the hazard.
- g) Address ability to repair within time to effect, with margin.



GATEWAY Safety Approach

Process for the approval of the safety analyses:

3-Phased Safety Review: Phase 0/I, Phase II and Phase III for both Flight and Ground Safety

Safety and Technical Authority: **Gateway ESA Safety Review Panel GESRP**

Co-Participation to the Safety Reviews of:

- **NASA** Gateway Integrated Safety Review Panel **GISRP**.
- Gateway **JAXA** Safety Review Panel **GJSRP**.
- Gateway **CSA** Safety Review Panel **GCSR**.
- NASA **SLS/EGS** combined Payload Safety Review Panel **PSRP**.



I-HAB Safety Review Process and Activities

Phase 0/I Flight Safety Review:

done in 2021, 67 Hazard Reports submitted: ~340 Hazard Causes, 1020 Hazard Controls identified

Delta Phase 0/I Flight Safety Review:

to close Phase 0/1 Flight SR, ongoing in 2023

5 Safety Review Meetings planned, addressing 7-10 Hazard reports each

Hazard Reports drafted: **43** (grouped version for Crewed and Uncrewed Phases)

Hazard Causes Analyzed: ~ **270**

Hazard Controls Identified: ~ **810**


Panel members: **70-80** safety and subject matter **experts**

Phase 0/I Ground Safety Review:

planned in middle 2023, 28 Hazard Reports drafted:

~150 Hazard Causes, 375 Hazard Controls identified

All this activity to provide the safest design achievable for crewed missions.



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THANKS FOR YOUR ATTENTION

